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Perspectives on the international 
relations of food 
Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala 
The international system of production, distribution and consumption of food is managed by 
states, corporations and international organizations. International organizations play minor 
roles in the food regime, principally as arenas for policy coordination among state bureauc-
racies and as agents for modest multilateral programs. All of these actors work within the 
framework of a set of norms, rules and practices that constitutes a global food regime. 
Currently, the regime is undergoing change. Growing demand for food, tighter connections 
among markets, and greater reliance on technology have increased the importance of interna-
tional adjustments. American preponderance in shaping regime features and insuring food 
security through reserves has declined. The dramatic price rises and rationing of international 
food supplies that occurred during the ''crisis'' of 1973-74 exposed serious deficiencies in the 
existing regime. At least five world food problems-potential shortages, instability, insecu-
rity, low productivity and malnutrition---continue as real or potential threats. To solve these 
problems the norms of the current regime that has existed since World War II are seriously 
under challenge. Re-evaluation and reform of the major principles characterizing the food 
regime are needed. 
Securing adequate food is one of the oldest problems confronting political institu-
tions. 1 Historically this intimate connection between food and politics has emerged 
in diverse forms. From the "minimal government" of nomadic herdsmen and 
hunting-gathering peoples and the complex despotisms found in societies relying on 
Raymond F. Hopkins is Associate Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College. Donald J. 
Puchala is Profes-sor of Political Science at Columbia University. 
1This paper is adapted from revised versions of "Global Food Regimes: Overcoming Hunger and 
Poverty,'' prepared by Raymond Hopkins for the 1980s Project of the Council on Foreign Relations. The 
authors wish to thank Edwin Martin, Lyle Schertz, Dale Hathaway, I. M. Destler, Eugene Skolnikoff, 
Hayward Alker, Lawrence Krause, and a host of other food experts and CFR staff members for their 
insights and comments offered during various phases of the preparation of this chapter. 
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582 International Organization 
1mgation to the elaborate regulations for food growing and marketing in most 
contemporary states, the procuring of food has been a central factor shaping politi-
cal patterns and, in most cases, encouraging substantial government intervention. 2 It 
is small wonder then that as food systems have become increasingly global, with 
national markets linked together and technology diffusing rapidly, demands for 
solving food problems have shifted to the international arena. Unfortunately, in 
recent years the contemporary international system has been unable to deal effec-
tively with global food problems. 
This essay will discuss some of the most notable of these inadequacies. In 
addition, we will introduce a set of concepts for describing and explaining what will 
be termed the international relations of food. Guided by the conceptual framework 
designed in this chapter, this special issue of International Organization will ex-
plore the international relations of food, with particular emphasis upon the 
capacities of national and international institutions involved in promoting the pro-
duction, distribution and consumption of basic foodstuffs among the earth's peoples. 
Global food problems 
It hardly needs saying that the stimulus to the efforts which produced this 
volume is the consensus among editors and authors that there are global food 
problems. Problems, in the sense we use the term, are conditions of production, 
distribution or consumption that are sufficiently undesirable to at least some actors 
in the system that they initiate calls for change. It should be noted that there is a 
lively debate among experts over the dimensions and severity of world food prob-
lems. The controversy stems from many sources including differences in analysts' 
disciplinary training and ideological perspective, as well as from the varying data 
they call upon, the different forecasting and other methodological techniques they 
employ, and from crop conditions prevailing at the moment of analysis. In the 
judgments that follow, our approach has been to consider the literature carefully, to 
see points of consensus among otherwise contending writers, to evaluate others' 
conclusions and to frame our own arguments in the light of the best systematic 
evidence. Our analysis steers a rather unspectacular middle course between the 
positions of those who unrealistically minimize food problems and those who view 
them as so severe as to conclude that world-wide starvation will soon be upon us. 
We suggest that five important food problems exist. First, we face the threat of 
chronic food shortages in some regions, most notably in South Asia and Africa, and 
their attendant economic, political and human consequences. Second, current ar-
rangements lead to undesirable instability in supply bound up with unreasonable 
fluctuations in prices, unpredictable markets, and undependable trade flows. Third, 
certain countries encounter the problem of security of food imports, especially 
2Lucy Mair, Primitive Government (Baltimore: Penguin, 1962); Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). 
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where imports represent either important elements in national standards of living, 
or, more crucially, where they represent hedges against starvation. A fourth prob-
lem results from the low productivity of agriculture and related poverty in many less 
developed countries. Such conditions represent a barrier to both food production 
and general economic development as well as a costly waste of human resources. 
Fifth, there is chronic malnutrition, especially among underprivileged groups and 
classes in certain countries and regions. 
Each of the five problems is significant and hence deserving of extended 
analysis. For this reason we have asked several of our authors to discuss particular 
dimensions of the global food problem. Nicholson and Esseks, for example, deal 
with problems of underproduction and food scarcity in less developed countries. 
Seevers and Johnson each address the problem of market and price instability. 
Paarlberg takes up the issue of import security and studies characteristic responses 
to it. In separate articles, Christensen and Austin analyze problems of rural poverty 
and malnutrition. 
The five global food problems are obviously interrelated. Each is a cause of 
one or several of the others, and all lead to or follow from fundamental distortions of 
supply or demand for food. What makes the interrelatedness of global food prob-
lems analytically perplexing is that various elements of distributional distortion 
affect different countries and populations in different ways, sometimes at different 
times. As a result the universality of the food system tends to be blurred. Several of 
the essays in this volume are addressed to the interrelatedness of the dimensions of 
the world food problem. Destler shows how the very multi-dimensionality of world 
food problems creates a complex and at times contradictory policy process as the Uni-
ted States Government deals with food and agricultural issues. Nau examines how 
global considerations further complicate food policy making and lead to a multifa-
ceted and multimotivated international diplomacy. Austin explores problems of 
international institutional proliferation and the consequent problems of coordination 
that follow as the interrelatedness of food affairs defies attempts to organize interna-
tionally. 
The truism underlined in this volume is that no single or simple policy, indeed 
no unilateral one, can solve all of the global problems of food. Nonetheless, as 
several of the authors individually suggest, and as the anthology as a whole implies, 
practicable steps toward coordinating national and international action can signifi-
cantly alleviate the severity of world food problems. 
As preview and overview to more detailed analyses in the essays that follow, 
let us look more closely at each of the problems on the agenda of world food 
diplomacy. 
Food shortages 
Food shortages in recent years were responsible for the dramatic increases in 
the price of grain and other basic foodstuffs in the early 1970s and for heightened 
domestic and international political interest in food problems. The shortages that 
developed between 1972 and 1974 were particularly severe due to the convergence 
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of an extraordinary cluster of causal factors. These factors include unfavorable 
weather conditions in major grain producing regions, shifts in American and Cana-
dian reserve policies, unprecedented Soviet interventions into grain import markets, 
high fertilizer prices, the world energy crisis, and a failure in the Peruvian anchovy 
catch. Analysts tend to refer to the years 1973-1974 as a period of "scarcity crisis" 
for the global food system, and several of the contributors to this volume use these 
years as a baseline for their analyses. The term crisis carries emotional loading and 
using it too frequently tends to destroy its analytical relevance. Therefore, we do not 
insist that readers accept that the years 1973-1974 were crisis years in world food 
affairs. It should be understood, however, that they were years of extreme and rapid 
change in global food supply and price conditions. Furthermore, they were danger-
ous years because food supplies had dwindled to the point where major famines 
would have occurred if conditions had deteriorated further. The gravity of the situa-
tion as it developed between 1972 and 1975 is captured rather dramatically in two 
sets of indices - (1) grain export prices, and (2) reserve stocks of grains. These are 
reported in Tables 1 and 2. 
Note in the tables how prices began their steep rise and total reserves began 
their deterioration in 1972. Although some American idle land was put into produc-
tion in 1973 to meet the situation, prices continued to climb and total reserves 
dwindled. However, the key factor affecting the price at which grains moved 
internationally in this period is not the total working stocks in the world, but rather 
the stocks of exporting countries. Many large importing countries maintain working 
stocks that are practically never available for export and hence not directly a factor 
in international market prices. Therefore, it is the stocks of the exporting countries 
that both provide the security backup for world food needs and constitute the major 
variable affecting prices and control over markets. 
Table 1 Average wheat export prices, 1968-1976 1 









































I. Source: United Nations,Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Vol. XXX, No. 12, (December, 1970), p. 165. 
2. Canadian dollars. 
3. Australian dollars. 
4. Figures are for June, 1976. 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 14:59:54 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Perspectives on the international relations of food 





























of idled US Total 
cropland reserves 







































Source: Lester Brown, The Politics and Responsibility of the North American Breadbasket, World Watch 
Paper #2, World watch Institute, October, 1975, p. 8; USDA, Foreign Agricultural Circular (September 
19, 1977), p. 2. 
I. Based on carry-over stocks of grain at beginning of crop year in individual countries for year shown. 
Stocks include those held by both exporting and importing countries. 
2. Authors' estimate. 
Comparing Table 3 with Table I indicates that the price of wheat mounted in 
1973 and 1974 as supplies tightened and, most dramatically, as the stocks of 
exporters declined. 
Table 3 Wheat in world trade 














































Source: International Food Policy Research Institute, communication with Barbara Huddleston. 
I. Stocks committed to specific future uses and hence unavailable for alternative allocations. 
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World prices became most extreme in 1974 (the first half of 1974 to be exact)3 
when they peaked at postwar highs, nearly four times above 1968 levels. Although 
world reserves fell to a two-decade low-where the world held only thirty-three days 
consumption of grain in storage-actual stock scarcity conditions among exporters 
became less severe by the end of 1974 and succeeding years. But, as of 1976, world 
reserves (Table 2) were still critically low. There had been no replacement of 
importers' reserves and the import-dependent world was still eating largely from 
month to month. During 1977, with production at or above trend for the second 
year, surpluses began to build, especially among exporters. But how these will 
affect the per capita food available globally, currently or in the future, is uncertain. 
The years 1972-75, then, are benchmarks in the analysis of global food prob-
lems. By hindsight, their greatest significance lies in the fact that they prompted a 
long overdue and sober analysis of the global food system. It must be borne in mind, 
however, that regardless of the apparent uniqueness of contributing factors, short 
ages in 1973 and 1974 fundamentally reflected the global growth in demand for 
food stimulated by rapidly expanding population. Scarcities in export-import mar-
kets in 1973 and 1974 were extraordinary only as regards their unprecedented 
severity. Improvements in supply conditions since 1975 by no means suggest that 
food scarcity is on the way to being overcome, either in world trade or in poor 
countries. 
Tables 4 and 5 depict some longer-run developments in the global food system. 
They dramatically document growing demands upon the stocks of food exporters as 
Table 4 The changing pattern of world grain trade, 1934-1938 to 1976 1 
Region 1934-38 1948-52 1960 1970 1972-73 1976' 
(MILLION METRIC TONS) 
North America 5 23 39 56 89 94 
Latin America 9 I 0 4 -3 -3 
Western Europe -24 -22 -25 -30 -18 -17 
E. Europe & USSR 5 0 0 -26 -27 
Africa I 0 -2 -5 -1 -10 
Asia3 2 -6 -17 -37 -38 -47 
Australia & N.Z. 3 3 6 12 7 8 
Note: Positive numbers indicate net exports; negative numbers indicate net imports. 
I. Figures derived from Lester Brown, Table 1.2, p. 11, and Potentiallmplications of Trends in World 
Population, Food Production and C Ii mate, OPR-40 I, United States Central Intelligence Agency, Wash-
ington, August, 1974, p. 15. 
2. Preliminary estimates of fiscal year data. 
3. Includes Japan and Asian Communist Countries. 
3FAO, FAO Commodity Review and Outlook 1975-76 (FAO: Rome, 1976), pp. 8-9. 
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Table 5 Net cereal deficits in less developed regions 1 
(MILLION METRIC TONS) 
Actual aver. Actual 
Region 1969-71 1974-75 
Asia 8.3 15.1 4 
N. Africa/Middle East 7.9 12.0 
Sub-Sahara Africa 1.5 2.1 
Latin America (1.0)3 4.2 









Source: Based on data presented in, Meeting Food Needs in the Developing World, International Food 
Policy Research Institute, Research Report #1, (Washington: February, 1976), p. 27; and "Food Needs 
of Developing Countries," Nathan Koffsky, Annex, April, 1977 (mimeo, IFPRI). 
I. Figures represent net deficits-i.e., larger gross deficits minus the predicted surpluses of potential 
exporting countries in the region. 
2. Projected on the basis of 1960-1974 production trend in cereals which averaged 2.5% per year; 
consumption projected on the basis of assumed population growth, income growth and income elasticities 
of demand for food grain and feed grain. Income assumptions that produced the projections in this table 
reflect ''low growth" variants (between 1.5 and 2%/year); if higher economic growth occurred, the pro-
jected demand and the consequent size of the deficits would be even larger (unless growth in production 
increased, growth already higher than in developed countries). 
3. Parentheses indicate net surpluses for region. Argentina is projected to remain a net exporter and Brazil 
will become a net exporter by I 990. 
4. Developing market economies only. Excludes Japan and Asian Communist Countries. 
(1) an increasing number of countries have had to tum to imports to feed their 
populations and (2) the degree of external dependence of importing states has also 
increased during the last two decades. 
The period from roughly 1950 to the present has witnessed a dramatic shift 
toward world dependency (especially Asian) upon North American grain surpluses, 
and this, hypothetically speaking, is projected to increase even more dramatically 
over the next ten to fifteen years. 4 We say "hypothetically" because projections of 
North American output suggest that export supplies will not be available to meet 
import demands to the end of the next decade, except at higher levels of prices (and 
correspondingly reduced demand), unless the growth of population and income in 
less developed countries is reduced and rates of growth in food production in these 
countries are raised dramatically. Even if high prices should push back demand, 
such a textbook "equilibrium" adjustment would not signal a solution to the prob-
lem of food scarcity. Indeed, it would most likely signal mounting hunger among 
the poorest people in the poorest countries. 
In addition to the food import needs of the less developed world, projected to 
'See USDA, The World Food Situation and Prospects to 1985 (Washington: United States Department 
of Agriculture, 1974), and Lester Brown, "The World Food Prospect," Science (Dec. 12, 1975): 
1053-59. 
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be at least 86.4 million tons in 1990 (Table 5), import demand over the next several 
years will be increased by the growing needs of customers such as Japan, Western 
Europe and the Soviet Union, unless these countries manage major strides in the 
direction of self-sufficiency. By a conservative estimate, needs in these areas will 
climb from 30-40 million tons in 1972-76 to the neighborhood of 45 million tons of 
food and feed grains in 1985. 5 It should also be noted that the ''Asian'' figures in 
Table 4 probably do not properly anticipate Mainland China's possible emergence 
as a major food importer. The expansion of China's agricultural production is 
estimated at between 2 and 2.69 percent per annum. While this rate has remained 
constant for several years and may be keeping pace with population growth, the 
instability of weather conditions in China would suggest at least some occasional 
severe shortages. 
As noted, the growth of demand for foodstuffs world wide is largely attribu-
table to rapid population growth, especially in Asia and Africa. But heightened 
demand is also linked to shifts toward higher protein diets in more affluent coun-
tries. In food deficit and poor countries population growth remains rapid, ranging 
from 2.0 to 3.5 percent last year. By contrast food production in these countries as a 
group has averaged 2.9 percent per year for the past fifteen years, and declined to 
1. 7 percent in the early 1970s. 6 For Bangladesh to be self-sufficient by 1990 her 
food production growth rate would need to rise from 1.5 percent to 4.5 percent for 
the next twelve years. Even if bumper crops produced in South Asia in 1975 and 
1976 were to continue, scarcities in that region would be likely to persist. The 
dramatic 1975-77 rise in grain production in South Asia put the region back near its 
longer-run trend of yearly increase. But, even at this level, output in the region 
remains one to three percent below what is needed for meeting domestic economic 
demand for food. As expanding population threatens food supplies in poorer coun-
tries, consumers in industrialized countries, notably in the United States, Japan and 
Western Europe and recently in the Soviet Union, are buying more meat, thus 
inflating global demands for feed grains. As economic development progresses in 
parts of the Third World there is good reason to believe that further shifts to meat 
diets will occur, at least among the more privileged classes. 
Given projected uncertainties in export supplies over the next decade, esti-
mates of the capacities of deficit countries to increase domestic production become 
important and revealing. Unfortunately, many of these assessments are rather pes-
simistic for a variety of reasons. Some analysts, for example, cite the rising ecologi-
cal problems that will accompany the use of more land for crops, and more intensive 
use of fertilizers and other agro-chemicals. 7 Others point out that diminishing re-
turns from land-saving technologies are already being encountered, that marginal 
'International Food Policy Research Institute, Meeting Food Needs in the Developing World, Research 
Report #1 (Washington: IFPRI, February 1976). 
6lbid., p. 13. 
'Eric Eckholm, Losing Ground: Environmental Stress and World Food Prospects (New York: Norton, 
1976). 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 14:59:54 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Perspectives on the international relations of food 589 
land brought into production is frequently ruined by erosion or desertification in 
short order, and that rising relative prices for energy and other basic input resources 
point to a tightening supply situation (current oversupply notwithstanding). In addi-
tion, there has been a marked secular decline in funding of basic agronomic research 
in the United States and elsewhere, and some experts at least, suggest that this may 
have ushered in a levelling in the growth of output that is irreversible in the short 
run. 8 Recent initiatives in funding for agricultural development are encouraging, but 
their impact will be felt only over the longer run. 
Despite the notable pessimism, however, it is fair to say that the preponderance 
of those who have looked into production problems in agriculture can identify 
adequate capacity in the years ahead to meet growing demands, including demands 
based on a desire for better diets. Notably, the capacity in question is the capacity of 
less developed countries to increase domestic production. But this will only be 
realized if research and technology gains are acted upon, if requisite investments are 
made, and if all other varieties of output-enhancing opportunity are grasped. For 
several less developed countries, including those discussed by Nicholson and Es-
seks, this means stemming declining rates of growth of domestic food production. 
For others it means pushing agricultural growth rates toward four or five or six 
percent per year. Even if such optimistic production potentials were approached, 
instability and occasional acute shortages are likely as long as sizable, readily 
distributable reserves do not exist. 
Instability 
Instability marked by extreme and erratic fluctuations in commodity prices has 
come to characterize and confuse international agricultural markets in recent years. 
Price instability tends to skew rewards from market participation toward those 
participants who can best afford to speculate. Conversely, it imposes penalities from 
market dependence on those who can least easily and least quickly adjust to fluctua-
tion, namely lower income countries in general and lower income consumers in 
particular. Beyond adjustment effects, fluctuating world food prices also tend to 
wreak havoc with public and private economic planning, again, most notably in less 
developed countries where planners must estimate food costs in their national de-
velopment plans. 
One can look at the global food problem in terms of conditions of increasing 
scarcity, as we did in the previous section. But, in addition, one can also view the 
problem in terms of fluctuations or deviations around the basic trend lines. From the 
latter perspective what we observe is that global supplies of foodstuffs fluctuate 
markedly and erratically from year to year due mainly to changing weather condi-
tions, variations in farmers' planting strategies, and government-promoted incen-
'James G. Horsfall and Charles R. Frink, "Perspective on Agriculture's Future: Rising Costs- Rising 
Doubts" (unpublished paper presented at Symposium on Limits to Growth, University of Connecticut, 
October 21, 1975). 
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Figure 1. Wheat area and production in the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and Argentinia 
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Source: USDA, The World Food Situation and Prospects to 1985, p. 23. 
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tives and disincentives. But until very recently, major fluctuations in production 
have prompted only minor changes in price due to the fact that during the 1950s and 
1960s the United States and Canada accumulated large reserves in periods of surplus 
and were able to release them in periods of shortage, thus buffering price shifts. 
They acted in a duopolistic manner to manage international grain markets. But 
large public reserves no longer exist, and North American policies no longer en-
courage their accumulation. Therefore, unless policies and capacities change, we 
have a situation wherein even mild shifts (less than 2 percent) in world supply 
can and do bring about abrupt and extreme fluctuations in price. Figures 1 and 2, 
charting conditions in the wheat market, illustrate our points concerning changing 
relationships between shifts in supply and fluctuations in price. Observe in Figure 1 
how outputs of wheat in the major exporting countries have varied in the past two 
decades (due in large measure to changes in planting related to variations in gov-
ernment support policies). By contrast, note in Figure 2 how prices remained 
relatively (indeed remarkably) stable through the 1950s and 1960s, despite the 
varying supply conditions, and then how they moved rapidly upward in the early 
1970s. The price rise is accounted for by the elimination of publicly held reserves, 
aggravated by the onset of worldwide inflation and the tightening of international 
supplies discussed in the previous section. As already shown in Table 1, prices 
continued to fluctuate erratically from 1972/73 onward (jumping approximately 300 
percent on the average between 1973 and 1974, when world production dropped by 
roughly 4 percent from trend, and then later dropping by approximately 20 percent 
Figure 2. World Export Unit Values for Wheat, 1948-1976 










1950 1960 1970 
Source: USDA, The World Food Situation and Prospects to 1985, p. 25, for years 1948-1972; FAO, 
FAO Commodity Review and Outlook, 1975-76, Figure 1, p. 10, for years 1973-1976, estimated 
yearly average U.S. No. 2, for years 1973-1975, projected yearly average for 1976. 
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between 1975 and 1976, when world production increased by roughly 9 percent. 9 
This, of course, is in great contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, in which increases or 
decreases in production of up to 35 percent resulted in price changes of only two to 
three percent. 
Price instability in international food markets exacerbates hunger in a number 
of ways. For one thing instability created by shortages can lead to "windfall" 
profits for those who control supplies, especially when prices rise far above levels 
needed to stimulate additional production. In such cases the extraordinary profits 
constitute largely a tax on consumers by producers. Within some states these excess 
gains are captured by grain dealers (private or public), credit agencies and other 
intermediaries rather than by farmers. When supplies are in excess, producers suffer 
as prices plummet. Marginal producers facing such market forces can be wiped out; 
supplies, moreover, may drop more than needed to adjust to the market and a new 
cycle of instability follows. 
Second, and equally important, excessive fluctutations in commodity prices 
undermine planning, both for individual farmers and for import-dependent states. In 
selecting the most profitable (and efficient) crop or mix of crops a farmer must 
estimate the prices he is likely to receive. When these fluctuate widely, rational 
decisions about planting are impossible. Similarly, development planners in most 
developing countries can see their efforts rendered useless when food prices fluc-
tuate widely, drawing off funds for development to pay for expensive imports or, when 
their countries are producers, excessively rewarding or punishing their rural sector. 
Government marketing boards and controls on agricultural prices through tariffs and 
domestic price supports are common buffers used in Europe and many developing 
countries to alleviate price instability by insulating producers, consumers or both 
from market extremities. Seevers, in his essay below, discusses such practices 
under the rubric ''market separation.'' When such devices work well, they transfer 
the costs of adjusting to price fluctuations onto national treasuries, directly or 
ultimately at the expense of public policy goals or taxpayers' pocketbooks. In 
addition, evidence from less developed countries suggests that market intervention 
programs are poorly or corruptly managed. As a result, they do not stabilize in-
come, they seldom stabilize prices of agricultural inputs such as fertilizers (which 
also fluctuate widely and particularly at times of food price fluctuation), they often 
act as revenue-raising or income subsidizing rather than stabilizing devices, and 
they tend to keep acting after necessities for intervention have eased. The problema-
tic record of market separation notwithstanding, public authorities can be expected 
to continue such practices, not only in the expectation that wide and erratic price 
fluctuations will continue in international food markets, but also because they are 
intimately linked to domestic politics. 10 
"FAO, p. 23 for production figures for 1973-74 and estimates for 1975-76. 
10Peter Katzenstein, "International Interdependence: Some Long-Term Trends and Recent Changes," 
International OrRanization, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 1975): 1021-34. 
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In developed food exporting countries large fluctuations in prices and export 
demands stimulate political discontent among farmers, as currently in the United 
States and recurrently in several Common Market countries. On the other hand, in 
food importing developed countries, fluctuating prices tend to raise fears about 
availability of supply and to provoke political problems accordingly. Although as 
Johnson argues below some price instability may be beneficial as it signals changing 
supply conditions and often prompts market-adjusting behavior, recent price insta-
bility seems to have exceeded what might theoretically be beneficial to the matching 
of international supply and demand. 11 
Security of food imports 
Food imports in many poor countries have become a chronically recurring 
"crisis." Food is transferred internationally via two channels: _trade and aid. Both of 
these channels have become less reliable sources of supply. Price inflation in food-
stuffs and competing demand from industrialized importing countries such as Japan 
and the Soviet Union limits LDC access to the international commercial system. 
Industrial countries' willingness to extend aid, which has fluctuated more according 
to both domestic and international political expediencies than to needs for food, 
similarly constrains LDC access to the international concessional system. What 
periodically changes this import problem into an import crisis is that many of the 
most populous less developed countries, notably India and Bangladesh, possess 
extremely limited capacities to adjust to internal shortfalls. Periodically, internal 
crop failures and the absence of internal reserves leave imports as the only dif-
ference between meager diets and starvation. If such imports are not obtainable at 
crucial times, famine or near famine conditions ensue with their attendant national 
and international political disruptions. In Africa, for example, successful coups in 
Niger and Ethiopia were directly related to drought and famine, and the whole 
Sahelian region suffered turmoil with international dimensions. Needless to say, 
even the threat that imports will not be available when needed breeds tension and 
insecurity, as illustrated by the role of food in Japanese-American diplomacy. 
For reasons already discussed imports of food cannot be the solution, at least 
not alone, to longer term scarcity problems of food deficit LDCs. Clearly, if the 
supply and demand projections discussed earlier are at all reliable, it is unlikely that 
adequate supplies will be available on future world markets. There simply will not 
be enough food to meet importers' demand even if exporters increase production to 
predicted maximums! Least of all, under these conditions, will very much food be 
available on concessional terms. In addition, it has been argued with some merit that 
food imports, and especially those that came gratis or on concessional terms, have 
aggravated poorer countries' development problems. They add to long-term debt, 
"Odin Knudsen and Andrew Parnes, Trade Instability and Economic Development: An Emprical Study 
(Lexington Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975). These authors point out that export instability, on balance, 
encourages economic development and that some degree of instability is probably desirable. 
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they often encourage the continuation of policies emphasizing urban industrializa-
tion that were responsible for inadequate food production in the first place, and they 
tend to encourage tastes and food consumption preferences that lead to continuing 
dependency upon imports. Nevertheless, regardless of the second best solution that 
concessional imports represent, some guarantee of food supplies or food aid will 
certainly be needed by deficit states in the foreseeable future. 12 Otherwise supply 
crises will recur, and, at the very least, these will cloud and confuse rational efforts 
toward internal development. 
Low productivity and poverty 
Low productivity and poverty plague millions of the world's populace engaged 
in agriculture, a point made both forcefully and compassionately in Cheryl Christ-
ensen's contribution to this volume. The rural populations of the less developed 
countries, constituting 60 to 90 percent of these nations' peoples, account for more 
than half of the world's population. As a rural labor force they are a key potential 
resource for greater food production. In addition, of course, these poor people are in 
most need of more and better food. Their low productivity is at the heart of the 
supply side of the world food problem. 
We cannot explore the problems of rural underdevelopment in any depth; they 
are beyond the scope and intent of this volume. To say the least, the problems are 
immense, their manifestations are almost as varied as the peoples and institutions of 
the Third World, the literature on these problems is voluminous, and prescriptions 
for their solution are numberless. 13 In the most general way, it could be said that low 
productivities in peasant agriculture in Asia, Africa and Latin America follow 
basically from the underemployment of land and labor. Technologies that would 
heighten the productivities of these factors are often not available. But, more fun-
damentally what are lacking are educational facilities and sources of credit that 
would enable farmers to use more productive technologies and markets that would 
offer inducements to technological innovation. 
Still, to look at problems of rural underdevelopment simply in terms of stan-
dard economic categories is to treat them superficially. Broader and deeper ques-
tions have to do with why backwardness often perpetuates itself when knowledge, 
and sometimes even capital, are available to overcome it. The search for answers to 
such questions leads one to explore the social, economic and political factors inside 
underproducing countries, and the international context within which these factors 
12All USDA and FAO projections tend to agree on this point. 
13Bruce F. Johnston and Peter Kilby, Agriculture and Structural Transformation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1975); Guy Hunter, Modernizing Peasant Societies (New York and London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969); Yujiro Hayami and Vernon Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International 
Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971); Herman Southworth and Bruce Johnston, eds., 
Agricultural Development and Economic Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967); Keith Griffin, 
Underdevelopment in Spanish America (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969); Keith Griffin, The Political 
Economy of Agrarian Change (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974). 
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exist. One needs to ask rather sensitive questions about who benefits from things as 
they are and who would stand to gain or lose economically, politically or otherwise 
if agricultural modernization were actually to come about. Although it is dangerous 
to generalize, politically powerful traditional elements in less developed countries 
who oppose land reform or other rationalizations of holdings are often major obsta-
cles to rural development. There are other obstacles. For instance, modernizing elite 
factions usually prefer urban industrialization to investing scarce capital in agricul-
ture; credit institutions (indigenous and international) balk at the high risks and 
uncertain outcomes in rural sector investments; and private and public agencies in 
developed countries see their interests challenged by the emergence of food process-
ing industries in LDCs which would help to bring peasant agriculture into the cash 
economy. One could go on to cite even more unsavory obstacles to rural develop-
ment such as programmatic racism and ethnic repression. At its crux, the problem is 
usually political, and the sad commentary is that peasants tend to be politically 
powerless. 
Some forces do push vigorously for rural modernization and increased prod-
uctivity in LDCs, and on balance the situation is not totally discouraging. The 
contribution by Nicholson and Esseks below offers a rather positive assessment of 
some LDC efforts at agricultural modernization. In addition, as Austin and others 
point out, international institutions such as the World Bank, the Organization of 
Economic and Community Development and the European Communities (EC) have 
lately begun encouraging greater attention to agricultural modernization and at-
tempting to gear their aid strategies accordingly. The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) also has been involved in this task for many 
years with comparatively increased efforts in the 1970s. Still, given the decline in 
per capita real aid flows over the last decade, progress toward heightened peasant 
productivity is likely to be slow and halting in years ahead, perhaps too slow and too 
halting to meet scarcity crises projected for the 1980s. Ironically too, given the 
meager diets of rural populations in less developed countries, most of these people 
constitute an enormous latent demand for food. Should they achieve increased 
productivity, increased demand would accompany it. For this reason, expanding 
output of such poor farmers is not an important threat to developed country export 
interests in agriculture. 
Malnutrition 
Malnutrition is both the most general and the most basic world food problem. 
By shifting attention from production and aggregate distribution problems to the 
actual consumption of food, the most intractable elements of world food problems 
are revealed. These are dramatized by Austin's contribution to this volume. Malnu-
trition, estimated to afflict between one half and one billion people, is substantially a 
product of poverty .14 People generally suffer from protein and/or caloric deficien-
14Overconsumption is also a form of malnutrition. It is not, however, a concern of this volume. 
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cies because they or their families cannot afford more or better food. The inequality 
of income that determines undernourishment is an international problem, as illus-
trated by low daily calorie intakes in Africa, Asia and Latin America. For instance, 
the average calorie intake of Brazilians in 1964-66 was adequate in aggregate 
statistical terms, but 44 percent of the Brazilian population was probably mal-
nourished. 15 Malnutrition deserves special attention not only because it is so wide-
spread, but because different targets and different institutions are required to solve it 
than rather simply to raise productivity. Poor farmers and poor urban workers are de-
bilitated by the effects of malnutrition. High underemployment and unemployment in 
poor countries may reflect the weakened health and low energy levels of under-
nourished people, and, to close a vicious circle, undernourished people are naturally 
the products of under- and unemployment. Even with successful steps to increase 
the aggregate amount of food available in the world and in each food deficit 
country, chronic malnutrition with its long-run debilitation of human capacities may 
continue largely unabated. 16 
Global nutrition problems have been the subject of concrete efforts by national 
and international groups, including church groups, foundations, development 
banks, ministries responsible for overseas aid and foreign trade, and US agencies. 
Political pressure for even greater efforts has been generated by numerous voluntary 
associations in developed states and by Third-World lobbying for the New Interna-
tional Economic Order, as at the 1977 FAO Conference. But so far, pressure has 
been diffusely targeted at a problem with no self-evident solution and has had little 
real impact on actually reducing malnutrition. 
Food systems and food regimes 
While the nature and severity of world food problems provide the context for 
the analyses contained in this volume, the focus of our collective effort is upon the 
international relations of food. There is presently, and has been for some time, an 
active international diplomacy of food affairs--communication among governments 
about food and agricultural issues, proliferating international organizations and 
bureaucracies concerned with food questions, countless international meetings and 
conferences, a good deal of official buying and selling, and all manner of bargaining 
with regard to commodities, money and technology. Paralleling these public activi-
ties are broad ranges of private venturings into international food affairs, from 
marketing to investing, to education and lobbying, to humanitarian projects of 
impressive scope. But, what exactly has been the impact of all this? Are peoples 
15See FAO, Assessment of The World Food Situation, (Rome: FAO, 1974), pp. 49-50, and Shlomo 
Reutlinger and Matcelo Selowsky, Undernourishment and Poverty, International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, Bank Staff Working Paper no. 202 (Washington: IBRD, April, 1975). 
••For a general review of malnutrition, see, James Austin, "Attacking the Malnutrition Problem," 
(unpublished paper presented at the Conference of the Institute for the Study of Human Development, 
Madrid, Spain, September, 1975). See also Austin's contribution to this volume. 
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better fed because of it? Might they be better fed without it? Or, do we have here a 
case of the proverbial "sound and fury," signifying very little? 
Our volume is designed to explore the effects of the contemporary international 
relations of food upon human welfare, most notably nutritional well-being. We are 
not agronomists, hydrologists, biologists or other technical specialists in the agricul-
tural sciences, and we therefore do not claim insights or aspire to new knowledge in 
matters of making things grow better, faster and in greater quantity. Here, we can 
but acknowledge the findings of colleagues in other disciplines and their implica-
tions. As social scientists, we begin from the assumption that food systems are social 
systems as much as they are biological ones, and food problems are political and 
institutional as much as they are agricultural. Food production, distribution and 
consumption are purposeful acts, following implicitly or explicitly from calculated 
decisions taken within the contexts of formal or informal social institutions. Under-
standing such decisions within such contexts is essential to understanding food 
systems and their impact upon human welfare. Much of the work contained in the 
essays to follow was informed, and guided, by these assumptions; much was also 
based on a common set of analytical concepts which it will be useful to make 
explicit. 
First, throughout the volume the concept "global food system" is rather nar-
rowly defined. It has been necessary to specify carefully this concept because it 
embodies many of our dependent variables, i.e., the outcomes we are trying to 
understand. Therefore, regardless of what the term "global food system" might 
mean in other contexts, here it refers to three interconnectedfunctions--production, 
distribution and consumption-and to their means of interconnectedness via public 
and private transactions. By "transactions" we mean bargains or other manners of 
agreement that initiate flows of commoc;lities, capital, information, technology or 
personnel. Such flows, of course, link production to distribution to consumption. 
Structurally, the global food system is composed of centers of production, centers of 
consumption and channels of distribution (and exchange). Typical centers are coun-
tries and regions and, as noted below, channels are commercial and concessional, 
public and private. It should be understood that most of the transactions that consti-
tute characteristic patterns in the production, distribution and consumption of food 
at given times are not international transactions (as most food is produced with local 
inputs and consumed domestically) but some important ones are. These interna-
tional transactions are of prime analytical interest to the contributors to this volume, 
both as important characteristics of the global food system and as factors affecting 
non-international patterns. Food aid, for example, has been frequently cited as an 
important factor depressing production in recipient countries. 17 
Of central importance to our collective study is the assumption that conditions 
prevailing in the global food system occur neither haphazardly nor entirely in 
11Theodore W. Schultz, "Value of U.S. Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped Countries," Journal of 
Farm Economics, Vol. 42 (December 1960): 1028-9, and Clifford R. Kern, "Looking a Gift Horse in the 
Mouth: The Economics of Food Aid Programs," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 8 (March 1968): 
59-75. 
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response to agronomic or economic imperatives. Rather, they occur because people 
make decisions about production, distribution and consumption that accord with 
commonly accepted and widely prevailing norms which lend legitimacy to certain 
practices and declare others illegitimate. Sets of such guiding norms prevailing at 
given times constitute regimes. We find the concepts "regime" and "global food 
regime'' particularly useful analytically and use them consistently throughout the 
volume. A regime is a set of rules, norms or institutional expectations that govern a 
social system. Govern, in the sense we use it, means to control, regulate or oth-
erwise lend order, continuity or predictability. We assume that there is a global 
food regime that governs the global food system, and we shall attempt to demon-
strate in this volume that a specifiable regime has governed international aspects of 
the food system for some time. Furthermore, we believe that it can be shown that 
the food regime governs the food system because regime norms influence the 
transactions which determine the system. That is, the international relations of food 
affairs are by and large conducted within normative parameters which prescribe 
certain kinds of transactions and proscribe others. Some norms are formal rules or 
laws, others exist as informal but institutionalized expectations. Together they 
influence practices which in tum shape the general behavior of the system as 
adjustments occur among various parts of the food system to particular actions 
fostered or tolerated by the regime. Empirically speaking, the existence and nature 
of the regime is observable in such events as (1) the intensities and directions of 
flows of food-related transactions among regime participants; (2) the agendas, 
manifest and latent, of forums where food issues are discussed; (3) the patterns of 
allocation of public and private resources for solving food problems; (4) the patterns 
of outcome, recommendation, institutionalization and practice reflected in the re-
sults of public and private food diplomacy; and (5) the rhetoric, both supportive and 
critical, of participants. 
The usefulness of the ''regime'' concept is as much in the kinds of questions it 
raises as in the order it lends to analysis. For example, if indeed there is such a thing 
as a global food regime which consists of hundreds of specific rules and norms that 
guide international decisions about food transactions, what in fact are these rules 
and norms? What are their principal features and what principles seem to underlie 
them? Furthermore, where, when and how do they originate? How and by whom or 
what are they maintained or enforced? To what extent are they consistent, coherent 
and valued (and hence likely to be heavily institutionalized)? When, why and how 
do they change? Most significant, perhaps, what kind of global food system do 
regime norms create? In this last respect it is important to ask and answer questions 
about the ways in which the global food regime affects participants in the global 
food system, i.e., those individuals, organizations and populations that either pro-
duce, consume and distribute food or directly affect these processes. The regime 
could affect participants in the system by affecting the values they derive from 
participation. These might include wealth, power, autonomy, community, nutri-
tional well-being, aesthetic satisfaction in eating and sometimes physical survival. 
Since any regime conditions the distribution of such values among participants, 
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usually in some skewed fashion, it is important to inquire into the ways that particu-
lar regimes condition particular distributions. A good deal of the analysis in this 
volume pursues such issues. 
Readers moving progressively from chapter to chapter will observe the 
emergence of a comprehensive picture of the global food system. The system 
appears decentralized into national subsystems where most production, consump-
tion and exchange take place, though still heavily affected by international transac-
tions. In its international aspects the global food system is bifurcated along two 
dimensions. First, it is clearly divided into surplus and deficit producing countries, 
that is, exporters and importers, and the dependence of the latter upon the former is 
apparently increasing (which is not to deny that there are elements of reciprocal 
dependence in the relationship). Moreover, as Table 6 shows, exporting developed 
countries are also much heavier grain consumers than are developing country im-
porters, because they consume a large share of grain through feed for animals. 
Table 6 Annual grain consumption by main uses, 1970-1990 
ACTUAL CONSUMPTION PROJECTED DEMAND' 
1970 1980 1985 1990 
Developed Countries (Million Tons) 
Food 160.9 163.1 164.1 164.6 
Feed 371.5 467.9 522.7 565.7 
Other Uses 84.9 100.6 109.5 116.4 
Total 617.3 731.6 796.3 846.7 
(Kilograms) 
Per Capita 576 623 649 663 
Developing 
Market Economies (Million Tons) 
Food 303.7 409.3 474.5 547.2 
Feed 35.6 60.9 78.6 101.9 
Other Uses 46.4 64.1 75.4 88.5 
Total 385.7 534.3 628.5 737.6 
(Kilograms) 
Per Capita 220 233 240 246 
Developing Centrally 
Planned Economies (Million Tons) 
Food 164.1 200.5 215.2 225.3 
Feed 15.3 38.7 48.7 61.4 
Other Uses 24.6 32.6 36.0 39.1 
Total 204.0 271.8 299.9 325.8 
(Kilograms) 
Per Capita 257 290 298 304 
I. FAO projections based on "trend" GDP growth and U.S. '.'medium" population projections. 
Source: In Overseas Development Council ( 1977) The United States and World Development Agenda 
(New York: Praeger Publishers), p. 184; adapted by the ODC from: Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the US (1975) Population, Food Supply and Agricultural Development (Rome: FAO), p. 28. 
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Second, two networks of transactions link producing countries to consuming 
countries: a commercial network of sellers and buyers and a concessional network 
of donors and recipients. Commercial channels carry the bulk of food through the 
food system, as well as the inputs for growing it, and these channels primarily link 
North America to Europe, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and recently the USSR and 
China. Concessional channnels run mainly in North-South directions and remain 
crucial to less developed countries which lack the financial resources to meet all 
their needs in commercial exchanges. Production, distribution and consumption 
patterns in the global food system are markedly skewed; the populations in wealthy 
industriali_zed countries and the wealthy in some less developed countries are dis-
tinctly privileged. The global food system, "Overall, is inadequate to the needs and 
aspirations of many of its participants, and these multiple inadequacies, as ex-
plained above, are the causes of "world food problems." 
Both the nature and the inadequacies of the global food system are influenced 
but not fully determined by the contemporary global food regime. This regime, as 
regards the international relations of food, has been American centered and pre-
scribed, and based principally upon national government actions. To some extent it 
has relied upon multinational enterprises, private interest groups, and formal inter-
national organizations to enforce its rules and norms. The regime was fairly stable 
and institutionalized from the late 1940s until the early 1970s, during which time 
participants had complementary, congruent, and usually accurate expectations 
about relationships between their transactions and systemic outcomes. 
Norms that guided (and constrained) the international relations of food from 
the late forties to the early seventies can be grouped into at least eight sets of 
principles. 
I. Respect for the free market. Most major participants in the international 
diplomacy of food between 1948 and 1972 adhered to the belief that a properly 
functioning free market would be the most efficient allocator of globally traded food 
commodities and agricultural inputs. They therefore advocated such a market, as-
pired towards it, at least in rhetoric, and assessed food affairs in terms of free market 
models. Actual practice deviated rather markedly from free trade ideals. 
In fact, cynics might want to suggest that the principle under discussion here 
could better be labelled, ''talk about free trade, but practice mercantilism.'' Canada 
and the U.S. have been described as alternate price leaders in a North American 
duopoly during the 1960s. Yet, whatever the practice, free trade, anti-monopoly 
ideals remained so strong that deviators were continually compelled to explain and 
justify their behavior, and such inquiry and defense provided the making for endless 
debate within international institutions such as the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) and the International Wheat Council. 18 Allowing for the impact of the 
social-political factors that render international market reality different from the 
ideal of economic theory, a case can be made that food flows through the intema-
'"Jonathan Barker, "Peasants Under Capitalism" (unpublished paper given at the International Studies 
Association Meetings, March 15, 1977). 
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tional commercial system did in fact reflect norms maintaining free market aspi-
rations during the postwar era. Seevers' analysis below fits such an interpretation 
and advances the widely held argument that "perfecting" markets would have a 
benign impact upon the global food system. Christensen accepts the realities of 
"market" norms but criticizes their impact on the food system. 
2. National absorption of adjustments imposed by international markets. As 
indicated, relative price stability in international food markets obtained during much 
of the postwar era and can be accounted for in large measure by American (and to a 
lesser extent Canadian) willingness to accumulate reserves in times of market 
surplus and to release these, commercially and concessionally, in times of tightness. 
Such North American behavior made the international market a much more predict-
able and acceptable food allocator than it might otherwise have been, and as a result 
free market norms of access and information were fortified. Still, it must be under-
lined that it was a rule of the food regime that North America would adjust domesti-
cally in the interest of domestic and international price stability and stable market 
shares, and that it would do this over and over again. Further, both American and 
Canadian participants in global food affairs carried out adjustments that served these 
de facto norms of market stability without much dissent from overseas or at home. 
3. Qualified acceptance of extra-market channels of food distribu.tion. Food 
aid on a continuing basis and as an instrument both of national policy and interna-
tional program became an accepted part of the postwar food regime in the years 
following 1954. Heated debates took place over the price-cutting and surplus-
dumping practices that followed the adoption of Public Law 480 (later the Food for 
Peace Program) in 1954. Eventually, multilateral concessional food transfers were 
legitimized by the United Nations World Food Program in 1962. Bilateral con-
cessional flows were accepted under terms of the Food Aid Conventions that ac-
companied the international wheat agreements of the 1960s. Previously, ac-
ceptance of this practice had been limited to food emergencies such as those 
in Europe following both World War I and II. Otherwise exporters condemned 
food concessions as dumping and recipients occasionally sought side-payments for 
accepting such food. In a system of free-trade-oriented participants, acquiescence in 
extra-market distribution could be obtained only upon the stipulation that market 
distribution was to take precedence over extra-market distribution. More simply, it 
was acceptable to American and foreign producer/exporters to give food away as 
long as this did not reduce income or distort market shares. While this qualification 
implies consistency between the commercial and concessional norms of the food 
regime, in practice there has been a good deal of tension, even within the United 
States, and energetic efforts were made to use concessional transactions to create 
commercial markets. 
4. Avoidance of starvation. The obligation to prevent starvation as an interna-
tional norm was not novel to the postwar period; it derives from more remote times 
(although the international community's capacity actually to muster meaningful 
relief is recent). There has been and remains a prevailing consensus that famine 
situations are extraordinary and that they should be met by extraordinary means. To 
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fail to do would be gross immorality according to world-wide standards. Ironically, 
the attention to and strength of this norm may be increasing currently, at the very 
time that food reserves available for famine relief remain near their thirty-year low 
point. 
5. Free flow of scientific information. There is some question about the ana-
lytical usefulness of labelling "free information" a norm of the global food regime 
because there has been great deviation from it in practice. Whereas most of the other 
norms discussed here emerged and prevailed during the postwar era largely because 
of American advocacy and practice, "free information" emerged in spite of Ameri-
can misgivings. "Freedom of information" about the results of agricultural research 
was a principle nurtured by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization 
and welcomed by those seeking modem technologies for agricultural development. 
In these ways this principle upheld norms for disclosure for the global food regime. 
On the other hand, American commercial practice, both public and private, was to 
protect certain information for market advantage. As long as the United States 
adhered to these practices the global flow of scientific information about agriculture 
was impaired. Many recent developments suggest, however, that American at-
titudes and practices with regard to disseminating scientific information have 
changed. However, many countries, notably the Soviet Union, have never accepted 
the principle of free information, at least with respect to "timely" (for them 
strategic) information. 
6. Low priority for national food self-reliance. Partly because the global food 
system of the past thirty years was perceived by most participants as one of relative 
abundance, and partly because of international divisions of labor implicit in free 
trade philosophies, autarky was not accepted as a norm of the global food regime. 
Quite the contrary was in fact the case. External sources of supply were accepted as 
dependable. Markets were accepted as stable. Aid was available both to those who 
would exchange political allegiance for food, and to those who threatened political 
deviation if food was withheld. There were, in general, low perceived risks in 
dependence. Most Communist countries, of course, rejected this principle of ''ag-
ricultural dependence'' in favor of agricultural development and internal ad-
justments. But the majority of other participants in the global food system ac-
quiesced. 
7. Lack of concern for chronic hunger. That international transactions in food 
should be addressed to alleviating hunger and malnutrition, or that these concerns 
should take priority over other goals, such as profit maximization, market stability 
or political gains, were notions somewhat alien to the global food regime of the 
postwar era. This is n9t to say that some individuals and organizations were not at 
work combatting malnutrition. But, in general, it was simply not a rule of interna-
tional food diplomacy that hunger questions should be given high priority, or even 
that they should be raised if there were dangers of insulting friendly governments by 
doing so. As a result, relatively few resources were devoted to alleviating chronic 
malnutrition globally, and little concerted action was undertaken. Austin argues 
oointedlv below that the result of this has been a continuin2: deterioration of nutri-
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tional conditions among the world's poor in spite of small gains in per capita 
production. 
8. National sovereignty and the illegitimacy of external penetration. It need 
hardly be pointed out that the global food system of the last thirty years functioned 
within the confines of the international political system, so that the norms governing 
the latter necessarily conditioned those of the food regime. Important among these 
was the general acceptance of the principle of national sovereignty; among the 
norms this supported was a tendency to define problems as those between states and 
a consequent proscription against international interference by one state in "domes-
tic'' affairs of another. In practice with regard to food this meant that production, 
distribution and consumption within the confines of national frontiers remained 
largely beyond the ''legitimate'' reach of the international community, even under 
famine conditions, as long as national governments chose to exclude the outside 
world, as Ethiopia did in 1973.19 In practice, this meant that many of the poorest 
and hungriest people of the world could not be reached via the distributive processes 
of the global food system. The world acquiesced because sovereignty was the norm, 
and hence the malnourishment of millions was not seen as a collective responsibility 
in any strong sense. 
Some effects of the prevailing food regime upon the global food system during 
the postwar era are easily discernable. In setting and enforcing regime norms for 
commercial transactions, the U.S. worked out trading rules through bargaining and 
formal policy coordination with key importers and other exporters. Communist 
countries remained peripheral participants with their own rules within Comecon 
(when the Soviets were exporters), although they occasionally interacted with 
"western" food traders, playing by the rules when they did. World trade in 
foodstuffs attained unprecedented absolute levels, and North Americans became 
grain merchants to the world to unprecedented degrees. Through concessional 
transactions the major problems of oversupply and instability in the commercial 
markets were resolved. Surpluses were disposed of in ways that probably enhanced 
the prospects of subsequent commercial growth for major food suppliers. Especially 
with respect to grain trading, adherence to regime norms enhanced the wealth and 
power (i.e., market share and control) of major exporters, most notably farmers and 
trading firms in the United States. Also enhanced were the nutritional well-being 
and general standard of living of fairly broad cross-sections of populations within 
major commercial grain-importing countries. Adhering to regime norms, however, 
also encouraged interdependencies among exporters and importers which, over 
time, impeded the international autonomy and flexibility of both. 
With regard to concessional food flows regime norms facilitated global 
humanitarianism and enhanced survival during shortfalls and famines, as in the 
Indian food shortage of 1965-67. But the norms contributed to huge gaps in living 
standards between richer countries and poorer ones, they helped to perpetuate large 
19Jack Shepherd, The Politics of Starvation (New York: The Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1975). 
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gaps between the rich and poor within countries, and they failed to affect chronic 
nutritional inadequacies of poor people worldwide. By promoting transfers of cer-
tain types of production technology as well as foodstuffs, regime norms also con-
tributed to diffusing more capital intensive farming, specialized rather than self-
reliant crop choices, and a sharp rise in productivity (India, for example, doubled 
her production growth rate after 1950 compared to the historic trend in the first half 
of this century). One result has been cultural; expectations of people everywhere 
include a growing demand for "high income" food commodities, as for example 
wheat and meat, and a growing reliance upon high technology, high energy inputs. 
Over all, the food regime reflected, and probably reinforced, the global political-
economic status quo that prevailed from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. 
Later chapters of this volume suggest that the global food regime may be 
changing. For one thing many of the norms seem to be in question at present, either 
because they are unacceptable to increasingly powerful Third-World countries and 
coalitions, or because they are no longer acceptable to the United States. Free trade 
philosophies, for example, are under assault by exponents of the New International 
Economic Order. International market stability and open market access provided by 
domestic adjustments and practices in the United States are no longer guaranteed by 
the support of substantial political interests in this country. Other norms, such as the 
primacy of market development over economic assistance goals, are in question 
because participants widely recognize that adhering to them would exacerbate the 
whole range of world food problems. To take a case in point, almost no one any 
longer is discouraging national agricultural developments that enhance self-reliance 
in grain crops, and almost no one any longer is withholding scientific information or 
technical assistance that could further such agricultural development. Moreover, 
capital intensive technology is out of vogue; labor intensive techniques to provide 
rural populations with work are encouraged. To be sure, elements of carryover and 
continuity from the postwar regime persist, and rather intense international debate 
surrounds the wisdom of changing norms. Unfortunately, as we write (1978), the 
most accurate conclusion concerning the global food regime is a rather unsatisfac-
tory one. The normative content of the regime is in flux. Any number of indices 
suggest that the postwar global food regime has probably passed into history. Yet its 
successor has failed to emerge clearly. The 1970s are unlikely to be years that 
produce global consensus on almost anything. For policy makers these years of 
regime flux are likely to prove extraordinarily difficult. 
Participants: key food actors and institutions 
The norms guiding the international relations of food emerge in the decen-
tralized world polity. They arise from the actions and interactions of states and other 
organizations. They are bargained rules, for the most part, though bargaining capac-
ity tends to be asymmetric and closely linked to participants' command over the 
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resources required to make transactions. More simply put, big buyers and sellers, 
producers and consumers in commercial networks and big donors in concessional 
ones have major (though not exclusive) influence over food regime norms. At times 
"global norms" have entailed little more than universal acceptance of a major 
participant's unilateral policies. 
The United States and the global food regime 
Because of the United States' position as the leading food exporter, and a huge 
consumer, especially on _a per capita basis, the decisions of public and private 
officials in this country have weighed heavily, often decisively, in setting and 
enforcing norms of the global food regime. This is especially true with regard to the 
setting of patterns and prices in the international grain trade, and volumes and 
directions of international food aid. In some instances, the American ability to 
produce and export huge yearly surpluses placed this country in the position of 
supplier of first, last, and just about only resort for food-deficit populations over-
seas. Such quantitative dominance has doubtlessly amplified American influence 
over the global food regime. As a US official responsible for the daily operation of 
the export monitoring system, set up in 1974, remarked: "We come very close to 
being one market; world grain prices, for instance are set in Chicago - it is the 
Chicago price plus transportation anywhere." Previously, the US domestic price, 
less subsidies set by Congress or the Secretary of Agriculture, largely determined 
world wheat prices, and, except for rice where Thailand's influence is important, 
North American policies determined the international prices at which most grains 
would flow both commercially and concessionally. 
The preponderance of the United States is declining in some areas (for in-
stance, US food aid provided 90 percent of the total in the 1960s but only 60 percent 
in 1975) and in other areas its dominance is precarious. The U.S., for example, was 
the leading rice exporter for the decade 1965-1975, while producing less than two 
percent of the world's rice. But this position is regularly challenged by Thailand. 
More recently, Brazil has been challenging the US in the soybean market; likewise, 
competition in beef is stiffening. Meanwhile, Western European agricultural scien-
tists have been working with strains and breeds to lower the EC's dependence on 
imported North American feedgrains. Agricultural trade as a proportion of world 
trade is also declining, from 33 percent in 1950-1955 to 17 percent in 1971-1975. 
Still, the US share of world agricultural trade has remained stable, averaging 12 to 
15 percent in the period 1950-1977, though rising to 16 percent during the "crisis" 
period of 1973-1974. 
American preponderance in the global food system, and US influence over the 
food regime, are less challengeable in other respects. The United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) has a central role in the global intelligence network which 
informs production, consumption and trade worldwide. USDA monitoring and re-
search activities with regard to world crops (plus complementary work by the 
Central Intelligence Agency with special attention to the Soviet and Chinese situa-
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tions) are looked upon as highly authoritative. Published intelligence from US 
sources is used by many other governments, as well as by farmers and multinational 
agribusiness firms. The contribution of these data-gathering and processing activi-
ties to the functioning of the global food system should not be underestimated. Nor 
should we underestimate the global systemic impacts of American public and pri-
vate agronomic research, which remains the most extensive in the world. Greater 
openness and attention to more diverse problems in recent years has heightened 
further the global impacts of American agricultural research. 
All of this suggests that American behavior in international food affairs, and 
above all American public policy decisions with regard to agriculture, have a great 
deal to do with the functioning of the global food system and the setting and 
enforcement of the norms that govern it. Understanding the principles and forces 
that shape US agricultural policy therefore is crucial to understanding the global 
system. Extended discussion of American policy and policy making is beyond the 
scope of this essay, but these issues are analyzed in detail by I. M. Destler in 
this volume. 
In general, agricultural policy in this country, both in its domestic and foreign 
aspects, emerges from public policy processes characteristic of American govern-
ment generally. Pressures from farm organizations, the agribusiness community, 
consumers' associations, church and international relief agencies and a great many 
other factions play a part. Members of Congress, their constituents, committees, 
debates and election campaigns are important. Various inter- and intradepartmental 
interests within the administration intervene, including Agriculture, Treasury, State 
Department and the Office of Management and Budget. Foreign delegations and 
governments also attempt to influence the domestic political process. Because of the 
way the process works, United States agricultural policy predominantly serves 
domestic interests. Yet these interests are often in conflict; this frequently under-
mines the consistency of policy, even with respect to national goals. Destler dis-
cusses these policy issues at length below. 
The role of international organizations 
National policy decisions (or non-decisions) reverberate through a network of 
international organizations with food-related missions. Eighty-nine such interna-
tional intergovernmental bodies were recently listed in a report on American partici-
pation in world food politics prepared by the United States Senate. 20 If one were to 
go on to also count private associations, organizations involved in global food 
affairs would number in the thousands. It would require research and analysis well 
beyond the scope of this volume even to begin to map the full structure of the 
international organizational arena for food. Nonetheless, some mapping is required 
to help sort out the maze of acronyms and relatively obscure formal organizations 
that exist. Figure 3 provides such an overview map. 
20U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, The United States, FAO 
and World Food Politics: U.S. Relations With An International Food Organization, Staff Report 94th 

































































































Figure 3. The United Nations food network 
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What in the diagram is called the "United Nations Food Network" is a set of 
functionally interrelated institutions, individually and collectively mandated to re-
spond to problems in the global food system as defined by their member-
governments and international staffs. The Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAQ) is a specialized agency of the United Nations operating under a 1945 agree-
ment between the FAQ Conference and the General Assembly. It is an autonomous 
association, responsible only to its members (currently 136 national governments) 
and financed by them for its "regular" budget which largely pays for staff oper-
ations. The charter mandate of the FAO calls on it (1) to collect, analyze and 
disseminate information relating to food and agriculture, (2) to provide an interna-
tional forum for the consideration of food problems, and (3) to provide technical 
assistance to member countries. 21 
Most closely bound to the FAQ (or vice versa) within the UN network is the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The main source of technical assis-
tance in the UN, UNDP was founded in 1966 through a merging of the Expanded 
Program of Technical Assistance and the United Nations Special Fund. FAQ cur-
rently serves as the executing agency for most projects in food and agricultural 
development financed by UNDP, and UNDP reimbursements yearly constitute the 
single largest category of the F AO' s total receipts-about double that of the regular 
budget of 106 million (for 1978). 
Less intimately associated with FAO, but still importantly linked, are the 
World Bank Group, the three regional development banks, the World Food Program 
and other "cooperative" programs. Through an IBRD/FAO Cooperative Program, 
FAQ assists the Bank in identifying and evaluating projects for possible funding, 
and it aids prospective loan recipients in preparing applications. Less directly, 
linkages also exist between FAQ's Industry Cooperative Program, its Investment 
Center and the Bank's International Finance Corporation, where liaison and ex-
changed information guide private-sector investments in food processing and ag-
ricultural development. By way of their capital-raising activities, and via intra-
professional communication, the World Bank Group is connected to the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 
African Development Bank (AFDB), all of which finance agricultural development. 
The World Food Program (WFP), created in 1966, is essentially an interna-
tional food-for-work operation that finances development projects with payment in 
kind pledged by members. WFP also intermittently functions as a disaster and 
famine relief agency. Organizationally, it is linked to FAQ via appointments to its 
governing body, and via joint field operations. Cooperative programs also link FAQ 
to various other parts of the UN system; these include a program with the World 
Health Organization (WHO) on food standards - the Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion - a program with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) directed 
toward improving nutrition among children, and a program in education about 
21United States Government, PAO Interagency Staff Committee, "United States Objectives in PAO," 
(Washington, May, 1976). 
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global hunger and food needs, the Freedom From Hunger Campaign (FFHC). 
Several new organs were created by the World Food Conference in November, 
1974, and these are now operating in the UN food network. 22 Resolutions approved 
first by the Conference and lat~r by the UN General Assembly established a World 
Food Council (WFC) as the ''highest'' institution on world food problems in the 
UN system. Meeting at the ministerial level, the WFC is composed of 36 countries, 
nominated by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and responsible to it. Its 
composition represents a world fragmented into an industrialized North, an under-
developed South, a capitalist West and a socialist East. For broad policy issues, the 
WFC was intended to be the hub of the UN Food Network. Whether it will achieve 
this status remains to be seen. Until its third annual meeting in Manila, in June 
1977, disagreements over its authority and staffing blocked significant action. At 
Manila, a number of resolutions were passed on food aid, reserves, and policy 
coordination under multinational aegis. These were supported by the Soviet Union 
as well as Western and Third World governments. However, these resolutions were 
essentially hortatory, a point the Soviet government made in explaining its support. 
Also authorized at Rome in November, 1974, were the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Consultative Group on Food Production 
and Investment (CGFPI). The former, after an initial capitalization of just over $1 
billion for agricultural development was raised, began operations in 1977 with the 
special aim of helping the poorest of the less developed countries. It reports to but is 
not under the authority of the Secretary General of the UN, and its operations are 
overseen by a governing board composed of representatives of three categories of 
countries - developed-donor, developing-donor (e.g., OPEC) and developing-
recipient. The CGFPI, which began operations in 1975, was called into being to 
encourage larger flows of resources into food production in less developed countries 
and to coordinate the activities of various international donors. Patterned after the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the group on 
production and investment is sponsored by the World Bank, the FAO and the UNDP 
and hosts meetings of representatives of UN donor agencies, the development 
banks, foundations, donor governments, and recipient countries. As its name im-
plies, it is a consultative organ responsible for collating information and recom-
mending ways to increase, expedite and rationalize aid for agriculture worldwide. 
In addition to organs already described, there are several UN bodies which 
regularly consider food questions as aspects of their broader programs. Significant 
among these is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UN-
CT AD), where intense debate on North-South trade issues, many having to do with 
the terms of trade for agricultural commodities, has occurred over the years. 23 In 
many ways, UNCTAD has become as salient a forum for North-South agricultural 
22Thomas G. Weiss and Robert S. Jordan, The World Food Conference and Global Problem Solving 
(New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 155-166. 
238. Gosovic, UNCTAD, Conflict and Compromise: The Third World's Quest for an Equitable World 
Order Through the United Nations (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1975), pp. 93-114 and passim.; J. C. Nagle, 
Agricultural Trade Policies (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1976), pp. 70-97. 
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issues as has the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT) for developed 
western states bargaining on agricultural issues (although there has been little "suc-
cess" within GAIT in lowering trade barriers in the agricultural area!). 
Some words of caution are in order before we move from mapping into 
analysis and evaluation. First, organizations depicted in Figure 3 and briefly high-
lighted here are by no means the only international food bodies, not even as regards 
the UN network. For one thing, there are various coordinating committees and ad 
hoc food groups interlaced among the major institutions such as the Committee on 
Surplus Disposal of the F AO which monitors concessional sales for possible 
violations of anti-dumping norms. For another, many of the major organizations 
noted, the FAO in particular, contain _any number of quasi-autonomous, dif-
ferentially responsible organs within them. Second, the operational world of the 
groups and associations of the UN network is nowhere nearly as orderly, well-
organized or separate as Figure 3 indicates or as the discussion suggests. In reality, 
redundancy (for good or ill) is rampant, complementarity is often unrecognized or at 
least unexploited, responsibility and accountability are poorly defined, coordination 
is difficult, and political and bureaucratic competition further complicates the net-
work. Third, let us caution readers against mistaking activity for impact or accom-
plishment. There is a good deal of activity surrounding the international organiza-
tion of food affairs, but budgets are modest, authority limited, support from 
member-states is uncertain at best, and, for myriad political and bureaucratic rea-
sons, organizations tend to be restrained from accomplishing their mandated tasks. 24 
Yet international institutions should not be evaluated in terms of unrealistic 
criteria. Many global food problems could be more effectively addressed if interna-
tional organizations were more authoritative, more efficient and more able to com-
mand resources in pursuit of global objectives. Contributing authors make this clear 
in their discussions, and we return to elaborate this point in our concluding chapter. 
Rather than dwell upon functions international organizations do not (and perhaps 
cannot) perform given the environment in which they operate, we should note the 
functions they can and do perform in relation to the global food regime. Interna-
tional organizations in the food area affect, modify and occasionally enforce regime 
norms in at least four ways: (1) by prodding governments through public and private 
channels, such as speeches, reports and multilateral conferences, to confront issues 
that national bureaucrats might otherwise choose to ignore, (2) by collecting infor-
mation, fostering inter-elite communication and sponsoring research that gov-
ernments by themselves might take little interest in, (3) by providing international 
services that governments could not perform for political reasons, and (4) by 
legitimating unilateral policies or bilateral deals by lending them multilateral im-
primatur. 
With regard to our point about prodding or stimulating governments, the con-
24For a discussion of budgetary resources, see, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic 
Research Service, "Multilateral Assistance for Agricultural Development" (Washington: USDA, 1977). 
For commentaries on national support and political and bureaucratic problems, see, United States Senate, 
Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, pp. 25-68. 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 14:59:54 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Perspectives on the international relations of food 611 
tinuing debate concerning international grain reserves is particularly illustrative. 
The latest impetus for the idea of a global grain reserve came from a 1973 proposal 
by former FAO Secretary-General Boerma. The scheme contradicted American 
(and Canadian) policies at the time it was articulated, but it did receive collateral 
support from the number of independent studies by business and academic organiza-
tions in the United States and elsewhere. In this way Boerma's initiative became an 
issue in US policy making and, as Destler shows, it was hotly debated in Washington 
during preparations for the World Food Conference of 1974. Ultimately, the State 
Department's positive position toward grain reserves carried the debate and Sec-
retary Kissinger was authorized to announce US acceptance of the reserve principle 
and to pledge cooperation towards its realization. He did this at the Rome Confer-
ence. 
At this point the national debate about principle became an international debate 
about practice. The United States initially offered a plan for a reserve program of 60 
million tons - considerably larger than that suggested by Boerma. Washington 
then retreated from this position and fell back upon a scheme for a more limited 
reserve, nationally held and coordinated. But this by no means settled the question. 
Eighteen months after the initial pledge at Rome the reserve discussion was centered 
at the International Wheat Council (IWC) in London, where debate among potential 
participants in the reserve turned on questions about the total size of stocks, the size 
of each country's contribution, the method of holding the reserves, the distribution 
of costs, the conditions for accumulating and releasing stocks, the relation between 
food reserves and food aid, and the role of international organizations in the reserve 
undertaking. 
By the autumn of 1976 the "food reserve" question was re-injected into 
American domestic politics as a campaign issue, as candidate Carter became an 
advocate of international stocks. Shortly after the installation of the Carter adminis-
tration, Agriculture Secretary Bergland publicly proposed to build a modest US 
reserve of about 8 million tons,25 and renewed efforts at the IWC to attain interna-
tional support and cost sharing for a broader reserve undertaking. The issue may be 
decided by mid-1978, when the current International Wheat Agreement expires, 
either with a successful incorporation of new multilateral rules for managing inter-
national reserves or with failure and a return to relatively uncoordinated national 
measures. In the latter case, the United States will return (though less dependably) 
to its de facto role of principal reserve holder for the world. 
While the food reserve story is not yet concluded, our point is made. Interna-
tional organization prompting injected a significant issue into national policy-
making that many officials within relevant national governments would have pre-
ferred to avoid. When the issue was projected back into the international arena it 
took the form of a proposal for global collective action, which, if ultimately ac-
cepted, could become a new norm of the global food regime. 
"Under current legislation (1977), a U.S. domestic reserve of 35 million tons of grain may be accumu-
lated and held. 
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In areas of information, research and communication, the FAO is both central 
and significant. As the principal intergovernmental organization for food affairs, 
FAO participates in or reviews nearly all intergovernmental and transnational activi-
ties in the field. FAO's budgets for research and publication are small compared to 
amounts spent by governments for nationally focused research programs. Yet, the 
organization's output is substantial: its periodicals, yearbooks and country analyses 
are frequently cited, and its projections frequently guide national planning and 
policy making. 26 Its studies in agricultural adjustment have aimed to lower barriers 
to trade. Its research on fisheries helped to establish fishing area councils in which 
countries could address mutual problems; and through "indicative planning" re-
ports it reviews the investments and activities of countries and MNCs on a global 
scale with the purpose of mobilizing resources of individual states to address 
foreseeable problems. 
The network of institutions involved in international agricultural research is 
centered in the FAO, but it extends beyond to include national research and de-
velopment agencies such as the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment and Canada's International Development Agency. It also includes a number of 
quasi-public bodies such as the Consultative Group on Food Production and Invest-
ment noted earlier, and the ten international research centers coordinated by the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. Widespread interna-
tional communication about agricultural research is newer still. While a full assess-
ment of the institutions in this area is premature, it is fair to credit cooperative 
international research ventures during the 1960s with producing the "miracle 
seeds" for high yielding dwarf varieties of wheat and rice that led to what some 
proclaimed as a "Green Revolution" in food production. 
In addition to disseminating information and coordinating the creation of new 
knowledge, international organizations have become increasingly involved in field 
operations in rural modernization and agricultural development. Most of these ef-
forts, naturally, are targeted toward Third-World countries. Some of the development 
services of the multilateral agencies are discussed by Austin, while Nicholson and 
Esseks cover the problems that poor countries face. Though still modest, the budget 
allocations for such interventionist field programs have expanded rapidly since the 
early 1960s, and it has sometimes been the case that multilateral undertakings have 
reached countries and peoples denied bilateral assistance for political reasons. 
Fourth, international organizations have influenced the global food regime, by 
legitimating practices and patterns of behavior, thereby turning them into norms. It 
is not surprising that most practices legitimated by international organizations are 
often simply multilateralized versions of the policies and preferences of powerful 
member-states. Yet, there is still something to be said for member-states' seeking 
international endorsement, especially if it creates a barrier to actions that would be 
detrimental to other states. Furthermore, multilateral debate, such as at the IWC or 
'"Joseph M. Jones, The United Nations at Work: Developing Land, Forests, Oceans and People 
(Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1965), p. 118. 
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the Rome World Food Conference, has provided reconsiderations and modifications 
in national policies that multilateral acceptance often requires. Contributors to this 
volume report on a number of efforts of multilateral legitimation of norms, includ-
ing those for maintaining a concessional system of food distribution, those shaping 
"development" as an international responsibility to be fostered by the UN and 
FAO, those maintained by GATT for strengthening the free trade principles of the 
commercial system, and those that foster and direct the international research net-
work, including the principle of free flows of information. 
Despite (or possibly because of) their impact, support for international food 
organizations, most notably the FAO, has declined among industrialized states in 
recent years. This has coincided with the increased activity of the poorest states in 
the United Nations, where the various agencies charged with international welfare 
tasks have become primary arenas of debate between advocates of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order and their critics. As the global food regime of the postwar 
era has become subject to increasing challenge, stress and deviation, political lead-
ers in the United States and other industrialized countries have sought to protect 
their states' very large stakes in the traditional status quo. Part of their strategy has 
been to deflate universal multilateral bodies, and hence to dampen "populist" 
pressures by circumventing forums controlled by Third World majorities. Alterna-
tively, these countries' spokespersons have sought to create new specialized institu-
tions with built-in veto opportunities, weighted voting, limited membership or 
limited authority, and to propose bilateral alternatives to multilateral programs 
where one-on-one rather than one-against-many bargaining conditions would pre-
vail. 
Agribusiness and the global food regime 
Multinational agribusiness corporations, the largest and most numerous of 
which are American, must be included in any discussion of the global food system 
and regime. As managers of global food transfers, promoters of large-scale produc-
tion and facilitators of technological diffusion, the MNCs are often links between 
governments' intended policies and their actual accomplishments. This is especially 
the case with United States foreign agricultural policy, since the realization of 
official intentions in trade, aid, and development investment has depended consis-
tently upon the compliance and cooperation of the agribusinesses which actually 
handle the flows of foodstuffs, capital and technology. The major grain companies, 
Cargill and Continental, for example, are the effective managers of international 
sales of wheat, com, rye and other grains to Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union and 
other major customers. Similarly, US concessional sales, although approved offi-
cially, are actually negotiated between private companies and recipient countries. 
Multinational firms also affect global food production and agricultural pro-
ductivity through their investment decisions. Producer firms such as Esmark, Dole, 
Kraftco and Nestle affect poorer countries by promoting technological diffusion, 
altering patterns of land use and impacting upon local patterns of income distribu-
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tion. Cultural diffusion, also promoted by MNCs, has led to the introduction of 
western food marketing techniques, from supermarkets to McDonald's "golden 
arches" throughout the world, and such activities, for better or worse, have also 
promoted changes in dietary and nutritional habits in many countries. 
More analysis and appraisal of the effects of large corporations is included in 
chapters by Seevers and Christensen. Let it suffice to say here that while intergov-
ernmental organizations operating in the food area can be criticized for their limited 
impact on the global food system, the contrary is probably true with regard to the 
MNCs. The large firms have been both aggressive and effective, but their largely 
profit-motivated activities have had mixed effects. Their contributions in disseminat-
ing technology have been impressive. But a goodly proportion of their investments 
in the Third World have been in cash crops which actually compete with food crops, 
and in food crops that are exported to richer countries rather than eaten in poorer 
ones. 27 Similarly, their marketing activities, their occasional oligopolistic influence 
over prices and the secrecy of their transactions have had unsettling effects upon the 
food system. These were clearly in evidence in the case of the Soviet grain pur-
chases of 1972, where market management by the large firms, and the secrecy that 
cloaked it, hindered timely adjustment to the magnitude of the Russian intervention. 
Both Paarlberg and Destler analyze aspects of this Soviet grain deal in their respec-
tive chapters below. 
As regards the relationship between the MNCs and the global food regime, our 
judgment is that the large firms had little to do with the setting of the norms that 
have prevailed in the postwar era (except perhaps via their influence over US 
policies). 28 On the other hand, the regime as a whole has been benign by and large 
toward the interests of the big producers and traders. 29 The companies have profited 
in the environment that the regime created. The regime's emphasis upon commer-
cial dealings, its ethos of more trade and freer trade, its direction of concessional 
flows through private transactional networks, its encouragement of research in more 
productive technologies (notably a boon to fertilizer producers), and its relative 
underemphasis (until the 1970s) on small farmers in poor countries, who are of little 
use to MNCs one way or the other, all created an environment which, in no small 
measure helped produce multinational agribusinesses and sustain their growth. 
Food system and regime in perspective 
For all its complexity of structure and functioning, the global food system, 
especially since 1972, has not been functioning very satisfactorily if we impose 
"See Michael Lofchie, "Political and Economic Origins of African Hunger," Journal of Modern 
African Studies (December 1975): 551-567, and Susan George, How the Other Half Dies (London: 
Penguin, 1976). 
28Similarly, most poor countries have had little influence on the regime, except as their needs became so 
apparent as to be impossible to ignore. 
29lt might also be considered to have been largely benign toward the interests of poor countries, though 
not necessarily poor people in these countries, except where these interests conflicted with those of the 
major participants in the commercial system. 
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standards such as the stemming of scarcity, provision of security or the maintenance 
of price stability. Nor, for that matter has it worked very well to overcome low 
productivities in farming in less developed countries or to improve the basic nutri-
tion of the world's poor. 
At the heart of the system's incapacity to respond adequately and equitably to 
world hunger is the basic principle that underlies the norm-setting process of the 
regime. 
The rules of the regime originate as national policies which are internationally 
bargained and coordinated, by purpose or default, by multilateral agreement or 
unilateral dictate. This would be satisfactory if national policies (or at least the 
policies of those national actors that most influence the regime) gave high priority to 
meeting global needs. In fact, as suggested, the case is exactly the opposite: national 
foreign policies in agriculture, because of the political imperatives behind them, 
have tended to serve domestic ends ahead of international ones. This last point, 
incidentally, tends to be as true for less developed countries as it is for the industri-
alized states. The outcome of this "nationally decided, internationally coordinated" 
principle has been a continuing pattern of food flows conditioned primarily by 
market forces (from those who can sell, to those who can buy) unbuffered in recent 
years by reserves, and by and large undersupplied in aid. It might be argued that 
such a system is about the most that we can expect in a world of separate, sovereign 
and unequally endowed states. A number of authors contributing to this volume, 
however, are unwilling to accept this. 
The political forces shaping norms of the food regime are largely divorced 
from the majority of people most severely affected by problems in the global food 
system. These are the rural poor of the Third World. Food trade and aid, investment 
and information do not affect these people significantly since they are simply not 
part of the modem interdependent world. The poorest peasants of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America participate little if at all in cash economies and hence are neither 
stimulated nor distracted by price changes or other supply and demand fluctuations, 
international, national or otherwise. They are often unreached, even by their own 
governments' policies. Certain theorists, of course, argue rather persuasively that 
such isolation in poverty for the peasantry reflects not their isolation from the world 
system but their centrality in it. They are its victims, and their continued victimiza-
tion is crucial to its national and international functioning. Only a revolutionary 
overturning, it is argued, can break them out of their poverty. Only one of the 
authors below, Christensen, makes the case for revolution. Whether at the center or 
the periphery of effects from the international food system, such peasants, once 
involved in the causal links of the system, are both the most vulnerable and least 
potent group affected, at least compared to the minor extent of their involvement. 
Hence sober reflection upon the norms of the global food regime, as we perceive 
them, does drive one to the conclusion that the rules of the system have focused 
neither sufficient transactions nor attention upon the plight of the world's rural poor. 
By legitimizing ongoing concessional dealings, the regime might be said to point in 
this direction, but the residual role these have played as ways to "dump" have 
lessened their effectiveness. Further. intentions over who should benefit from for-
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eign donations have tended to shift markedly at the national borders of recipient 
countries, and the norm of sovereignty has muzzled international concerns with 
internal affairs, often to the detriment of poor people in the countryside. 
Finally, in addition to the broad and endemic inadequacies of the current food 
system, which will be difficult to rectify, other more specific shortcomings can be 
singled out that are perhaps easier to deal with. For example, there is currently a 
lack of productive resources and relevant technology available to countries needing 
to expand their food supply. Furthermore, in many poor countries public policies 
actually inject net disincentives to expanded food production. 30 Added to this are 
inadequacies in financial and administrative infrastructure which further hamper 
food production. Globally, there is no real control over grain production, no sys-
tematic stockpiling and no controls over trade and price. National policies in nearly 
every country, developed and underdeveloped alike, are still deficient with respect 
to nutrition and health. Population policies are rare and largely ineffectual. While 
many of these problems could be alleviated by changes within countries, in many 
cases the success of what is done will depend partly upon what is done in other 
countries, and partly, too, upon international norms. Global food interdependence 
requires collaborative policy efforts to establish rules for a new global food regime. 
Without such new norms, and appropriately compliant behavior, it is likely that the 
expansion of food production will occur haphazardly, and too slowly, with little 
attention to chronic hunger, little heed of environmental side effects, and little 
concern for distributive justice. 
30Abdullah A. Saleh, "Disincentives to Agricultural Production in Developing Countries: A Policy 
Survey," Foreil(n ARricultural Supplement (Washington: GAO, March, 1975), p. I. 
